PROBLEMS WITH AIR INDIA AND INDIAN AIRLINES MERGER

 

                                                                                                                            

  AIR INDIA, the brand that today encompasses both the erstwhile Air India and Indian Airlines, is in serious trouble. The National Aviation Company of India (NACIL), formed by the merger of the two airlines, ran up losses of Rs 2,200 crore in 2007-08. Losses for 2008-09 estimated at over Rs 5,000 crore. In 2009-10, losses could exceed Rs 12,000 crore. How did the airline get into such a mess? 

    Parliament's Committee on Public Undertakings (COPU) has come up with a report that seeks to identify the underlying causes of AI’s losses. 

    It is useful to begin by listing some perceived causes of Air India's losses and examining how far these are valid: 

    Public ownership is the problem: Governments just can't run commercial enterprises. There is no way that Air India and Indian Airlines could have survived in the face of greater competition. 

    There is a problem with this story. Several public sector enterprises have successfully weathered greater competition post-liberalization and are doing better than before. In the period since 2001, Air India made a profit every year until 2006-07. Indian Airlines made a profit in three out of those six years. 

       Air India suffers from a bloated work force typical of the public sector: Air India performs in-house a wide range of functions that other airlines outsource. Still, Air India's workforce per aircraft of 214 compares favorably with that of several other airlines: Malaysian Airlines (230), Virgin Atlantic (282), KLM (220), etc. Wages account for just 16% of total costs, so the scope for reducing losses through wage or employee reductions is quite small. 

    The failed merger is responsible for non-performance and losses: There is little doubt that the merger of the two airlines, done in 2006-07, has turned out to be a nightmare. But it is hard to ascribe the mounting losses to the merger per se. The synergies expected from the merger were fairly modest in the first place: around Rs 900 crore. Of these, Rs 500 crore was realised in the first year itself. The failure of the merger cannot explain losses of over Rs 5,000 crore in 2008-09 and the even higher losses projected for 2009-10. Merger makes it more difficult for Air India to respond to the situation it is in, it is not the cause of the situation. 

    Thus, none of the perceived causes can explain the mess Air India is in today. The report provides useful clues. Air India's problems, it turns out, arise from two errors, one strategic and the other structural. 

      It is clear that the root cause of the present situation is the massive fleet expansion plan initiated by the two airlines prior to merger. Was such an expansion necessary? Officials have justified on the ground that the two airlines needed to replace their aged fleet and also augment their fleet in order to maintain market share given that the market was expected to grow faster than in the past. 

    The market has not grown as fast as expected. As a result, NACIL is stuck with planes with low utilization and is having to lease out aircraft. In the case of Air India, 46% of addition to fleet was towards augmenting capacity; at Indian Airlines, the figure was 30%. (The rest was towards creating new capacity). 

  
    The second cause of Air India's problems is structural. The airline industry is inherently problem-ridden because it combines high capital intensity with volatility in revenues. Leverage in this business is bound to be high but it must be kept within reasonable limits. Air India embarked on a fleet acquisition plan costing Rs 44,000 crore on a paid up capital of Rs 145 crore. This was a recipe for disaster. 

   
One of NACIL’s new directors, Amit Mitra, also the Secretary-General of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), says drastic workforce restructuring is required. “The cost overhead is high and needs to change. But if there is an issue of workforce restructuring and it becomes a politically sensitive issue, one can look at enlarging the customer base.”

But sources within the ministry say this is just the tip of the iceberg. In fact, many top officials agree in clear-cut terms with the note COPU sent to Parliament. They say the merger process was to be completed by mid-2009 but till date, NACIL is just half way through. The synergy has worked well in the integration of network, cross-utilisation of aircraft fleet, leveraging scale for joint procurement like insurance and fuel, and the opportunity to join the global leading airline network Star Alliance, which offers customers worldwide reach and a smooth travel experience. But the merger has not worked in areas like manpower, properties and facilities integration, cross-utilisation of resources, IT augmentation and launching new subsidiaries such as maintenance, repair, and operations (MRO) and ground handling. “The have-nots have totally outweighed some of the benefits the merger achieved,” says India’s top aviation expert, Kapil Kaul.



REFERENCE

 (Publication: The Economic Times Mumbai; Date: Apr 15, 2010;Section: Editorial; Page: 16)

Acknowledgment: I thank Ms. Vaishnavi Krishna Mohan, Student of BA(Hons) Economics at Ahmedabad University for her support in content development

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